


## The re-securitization of Russia by NATO and Western countries based on the theory of collective security

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Article Info	Abstract
<p>Original Article (Case Study)                      Main Object: International relations                      Scope: Russo-Ukraine War</p> <p>Received: 08 August 2023                      Revised: 17 September 2023                      Accepted: 18 September 2023                      Published online: 26 September 2023</p> <p><b>Keywords:</b>                      collective security,                      NATO expansion to the East,                      Russia-NATO relations,                      Ukraine crisis.</p>	<p>The expansion of NATO to the east and its security consequences for the countries of the region have long been of interest to researchers. The crisis in Ukraine made the issue of NATO development to be at the top of researchers' attention again. Russia considers Ukraine's actions to join the European Union and NATO development as a security threat, and the Western countries also considered Russia's actions in annexing Crimea and attacking Ukraine as a security threat, which led to a "collective reaction" in response. This article seeks to answer the question of why the Western countries and NATO, which previously sought to de-securitize Russia, adopted a global response to a regional crisis and re-securitized Russia. The current article examines the current state of tensions in relations between Russia and the West by adopting a theoretical approach and specifically by applying the theory of collective security. The results of this survey show that after the developments in Ukraine in 2014 and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, NATO identifies Russia as a new source of threat. In this change of NATO's position, the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass crisis have been very influential as an accelerating factor. In this situation, the West's concern for collective action against Russia can be analyzed in the framework of collective security theory.</p>
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**Extended Abstract****Background**

This article delves into the re-securitization of Russia by NATO and Western countries, which is based on the theory of collective security. The expansion of NATO towards the east and its security implications for the region have been a topic of interest for researchers for a long time. However, the crisis in Ukraine brought this issue back to the forefront of researchers' attention. Russia perceives Ukraine's attempts to join the European Union and NATO as a security threat, while Western countries view Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression towards Ukraine as a security threat. This led to a collective reaction from the West, which re-securitized Russia, despite previous attempts to de-securitize it.

**Aim**

This article aims to answer the question of why the Western countries and NATO, which previously sought to de-securitize Russia, adopted a global response to a regional crisis and re-securitized Russia.

**Methods**

The article adopts a theoretical approach, specifically applying the theory of collective security to examine the current state of tensions in relations between Russia and the West.

**Findings**

The theory of collective security posits that states can achieve security by working together to address common threats. This theory assumes that states will prioritize collective security over individual security, and that collective action is necessary to address threats that cannot be resolved by individual states. The theory also assumes that collective security is a continuous process, and that states must remain vigilant to new threats that may emerge. The re-securitization of Russia by NATO and Western countries can be analyzed within the framework of collective security theory.

The West's response to the crisis in Ukraine can be seen as an attempt to address a common threat, which was perceived as a threat to the collective security of the region. The West's response was also an attempt to deter Russia from further aggression towards Ukraine and to prevent the spread of instability in the region.

As long as the US and its NATO allies consider punitive measures against Russia instead of trying to solve the problem they have created, aggression and continued war seem inevitable. In the current situation, perhaps Russia did not imagine that it would face NATO's comprehensive response and extensive support in Ukraine by sending Western military equipment and weapons to the front lines of the battle in Ukraine. Also, by taking into account the previous

experiences (2014 crisis) and emphasizing the collective security approach, while creating a common tendency among the member states to help Ukraine, NATO provided the ground to prevent Russia's quick victory in the war.

Finally, the adoption of NATO policies caused the continuation of the war in Ukraine and its further expansion to the East with the membership of Finland and Sweden. In general, it seems that with the continuation of the common policies of NATO members and the efforts of NATO member countries to adopt the approach of re-securitization of Russia from the point of view of collective security, the conditions have been prepared for the continuation of the crisis, and there is no suitable prospect for solving the crisis in the short term.

### **Results**

The results of this study indicate that after the developments in Ukraine in 2014 and the annexation of Crimea to Russia, NATO identified Russia as a new source of threat. The annexation of Crimea and the Donbass crisis were influential factors that accelerated NATO's change in position. In this context, the West's concern for collective action against Russia can be analyzed within the framework of collective security theory.

### **Conclusion**

This article highlights the re-securitization of Russia by NATO and Western countries based on the theory of collective security. The article argues that the crisis in Ukraine led to a collective reaction from the West, which re-securitized Russia, despite previous attempts to de-securitize it. The article also highlights the importance of collective security theory in understanding the current state of tensions in relations between Russia and the West. Finally, the article emphasizes the need for continued vigilance and collective action to address new threats that may emerge in the future.

### **Conflict of interest**

The authors declared no conflicts of interest.

### **Authors' contributions**

All authors contributed to the original idea, study design.

### **Ethical considerations**

The author has completely considered ethical issues, including informed consent, plagiarism, data fabrication, misconduct, and/or falsification, double publication and/or redundancy, submission, etc.

### Data availability

The dataset generated and analyzed during the current study is available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

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