کارآفرینی بر مدار قدرت: بررسی چندسطحی تعامل‌های سیاسی و نهادی در ایالات متحده

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 گروه توسعة کارآفرینی، دانشکدة کارآفرینی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

2 گروه مدیریت و اقتصاد، مؤسسة فناوری هاربین، هاربین، چین.

چکیده

با وجود تحقیقات گسترده دربارة رابطة کارآفرینی سیاسی و قدرت، تأثیر بستر سیاسی بر فعالیت‌های شرکتی همچنان نیازمند بررسی دقیق‌تر هست. شرکت‌های بزرگ از طریق اعمال قدرت قهری (لابی‌گری و کمک‌های مالی)، قدرت ترغیبی (تبیین سیاست‌ها)، و قدرت اقتدارگرایانه (تثبیت جایگاه بازار) در مدیریت فرصت‌های سیاسی و اقتصادی نقش کلیدی ایفا می‌کنند. هدف در این پژوهش بررسی نقش قدرت شرکت‌ها در شکل‌دهی به سیاست‌ها و تعامل‌های کارآفرینی سیاسی در بسترهای مختلف سیاسی است. در این مطالعه، تأثیر سه نوع قدرت (قهری، ترغیبی و اقتدارگرایانه) در سطوح شرکتی، صنعتی و مدیریتی بر اقدام‌های سیاسی شرکت‌ها تحلیل شده است. در این پژوهش با تحلیل واریانس بر روی داده‌های شرکت‌های عمومی ایالات متحده در بازة زمانی ۲۰۰۱ تا ۲۰۱۹م، تأثیر سطوح مختلف قدرت (صنعت، شرکت، مدیران اجرایی) بر اقدام‌های شرکتی (هزینه‌های لابی و کمک‌های مالی) و اقدام‌های دولتی (قراردادهای دولتی) بررسی شده است. نمونه‌ها بر اساس کنترل شاخه‌های کلیدی دولت‌های دموکرات یا جمهوری‌خواه تقسیم‌بندی شده‌اند. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که عوامل سطح شرکت بیشترین تأثیر را در تبیین اقدام‌های کارآفرینی سیاسی دارند (56 درصد واریانس). پس از آن عوامل سطح صنعتی (13 درصد) و در نهایت عوامل مدیریتی (9 درصد) قرار دارند. تأثیر قدرت شرکت‌ها در بسترهای سیاسی متغیر، به‌ویژه در دولت‌های جمهوری‌خواه، به‌طور قابل‌توجهی افزایش می‌یابد. این نتایج اهمیت نقش شرکت‌ها را در تعامل‌های سیاسی و ضرورت بازنگری در نظریه‌های کارآفرینی سیاسی نشان می‌دهد. این نتایج نشان می‌دهد که کارآفرینی سیاسی به‌طور مستقیم به راهبرد‌های قدرت‌محور شرکت‌ها وابسته است و به درک بهتری از تعامل میان شرکت‌ها و دولت در بسترهای مختلف سیاسی کمک می‌کند. همچنین، این یافته‌ها برای تحقیقات آینده دربارة نقش قدرت در شکل‌دهی به فرصت‌های شرکتی و نظریه‌پردازی کارآفرینی سیاسی پیامدهای مهمی دارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

حوزة موضوعی: ایالات متحده

Scope: United States

مراجع

محمدی الیاسی ق، چیت‌ساز ا، گرامی ع. (1389). «شناسایی عوامل درون‌سازمانی موثر بر عملکرد شرکت‌های نوپا». اقتصاد و تجارت نوین. 6(21-22): 27-48..https://sid.ir/paper/118653/fa
Abdurakhmonov M, Hasija D, Ridge JW, Hill AD. (2023). “Maintaining or altering the status quo in the non- market arena: Theory and evidence from government contract disputes”. Organization Science. 34: 1004-1026. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1606.
Abdurakhmonov M, Ridge JW, Hill AD. (2022). “Strategic risk and lobbying: Investigating lobbying breadth as risk management”. Journal of Management. 48: 1103-1130. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211011762.
----------------. (2021). “UnPolitical Action Committeeking firm external dependence: How government contract dependence affects firm investments and market performance”. Academy of Management Journal. 64: 327-350.
Audretsch DB. Fiedler A. (2023). “Power and entrepreneurship”. Small Business Economics. 60(4): 1573-1592. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-022-00660-3.
Barnard C. (1938). The functiones of the executives. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Barney J. (1991). “Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage”. Journal of Management. 17: 99-120. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920639101700108.
Baron DP. (1995). “Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components”. California Management Review. 37: 47-65. https://doi.org/10.2307/41165788.
Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2022). “Bertelsmann transformation index”. https://bti-project.org/.
Blais A, Blake D, Dion S. (1993). “Do parties make a difference? Parties and the size of government in liberal democracies”. American Journal of Political Science. 37: 40-62. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111523.
Blumentritt TP. (2003). “Foreign subsidiaries’ government affairs activities: The influence of managers and resources”. Business & Society. 42: 202-233. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650303042002003.
Bonardi JP. (2011). “Corporate political resources and the resource-based view of the firm”. Strategic Organization. 9: 247-255. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127011417926.
Bono R, Blanca MJ, Arnau J, Gómez-Benito J. (2017). “Non-normal distributions commonly used in health, education, and social sciences: A systematic review”. Frontiers in Psychology. 8: 1602. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01602.
Bowman EH, Helfat CE. (2001). “Does corporate strategy matter?”. Strategic Management Journal. 22: 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1002/1097-0266(200101)22:1<1::AID-SMJ143>3.0.CO;2-T.
Brush TH, Bromiley P, Hendrickx M. (1999). “The relative influence of industry and corporation on business segment performance: An alternative estimate”. Strategic Management Journal. 20: 519-547. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199906)20:6<519::AID-SMJ32>3.0.CO;2-8.
Burris ER. (2005). The Politics of Speaking out: Responses to Voice in Organizations. ProQuest: Cornell University.
Caldeira GA, Hojnacki M, Wright JR. (2000). “The lobbying activities of organized interests in federal judicial nominations”. Journal of Politics. 62: 51-69. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-3816.00003.
Campbell JL. (2007). “Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? An institutional theory of corporate social responsibility”. Academy of Management Review. 32(3): 946-967. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2007.25275684.
---------------. (2002). “Ideas, politics, and public policy”. Annual Review of Sociology. 28: 21-38. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.141111.
Certo ST, Busenbark JR, Kalm M, LePine JA. (2020). “Divided we fall: How ratios undermine research in strategic management”. Organizational Research Methods. 23(2): 211-237. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1177/1094428118773455.
Chandler JA, Kim Y, Waddingham JA, Hill AD. (2023). “Going global? CEO political ideology and the choice between international alliances and international acquisitions”. Journal of International Business Studies. 54: 1441-1470. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-023-00607-0.
Chin MK, Hambrick DC, Treviño LK. (2013). “Political ideologies of CEOs: The influence of executives’ values on corporate social responsibility”. Administrative Science Quarterly. 58: 197-232. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839213486984.
Chitsaz E, Liang D, Khoshsoroor S. (2017). “The impact of resource configuration on Iranian technology venture performance”. Technological Forecasting and Social Change. 122: 186-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.03.009.
Choi SJ, Jia N, Lu J. (2015). “The structure of political institutions and effectiveness of corporate political lob- bying”. Organization Science. 26: 158-179. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0936.
Choma B, Hodson G, Jagayat A, Hoffarth MR. (2020). “Right-wing ideology as a predictor of collective action: A test across four political issue domains”. Political Psychology. 41: 303-322. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12615.
Coleman JJ. (1999). “Unified government, divided government, and party responsiveness”. American Political Science Review. 93: 821-835. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586115.
Colomer JM. (2005). “It’s parties that choose electoral systems (or, Duverger’s laws upside down)”. Political Studies. 53: 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00514.x.
Cox G, Kernell S. (2019). The Politics of Divided Government. New York: Routledge.
De Figueiredo JM, Silverman BS. (2006). “Academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying”. The Journal of Law and Economics. 49: 597-625. https://doi.org/10.1086/508248.
Den Hond F, Rehbein KA, de Bakker FG, Lankveld HK. (2014). “Playing on two chessboards: Reputation effects between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity (CPA)”. Journal of Management Studies. 51: 790-813. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12063.
Djankov S, Ganser T, McLiesh C, Ramalho R, Shleifer A. (2010). “The effect of corporate taxes on investment and entrepreneurship”. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. 2: 31-64. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.2.3.31.
DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW. (1983). “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields”. American Sociological Review. 48(2): 147-160. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691229270-005.
The Economist. (2024). “The opportunities and dangers for Trump's disrupter-in-chief”. November 21. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/11/21/the-opportunities-and-dangers-for-trumps-disrupter-in-chief.
Epstein D, O’halloran S. (1996). “Divided government and the design of administrative procedures: A formal model and empirical test”. The Journal of Politics. 58: 373-397. https://doi.org/10.2307/2960231.
Espinosa M. (2021). “Labor boundaries and skills: The case of lobbyists”. Management Science. 67: 1586-1607. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3598.
Fiorina MP, Abrams SJ. (2008). “Political polarization in the American public”. Annual Review of Political Science. 11: 563-588. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836.
Fernandes BP, Dias M. (2024). “Business lobbying: A systematic literature review”. Economics and Business Quarterly Reviews. 7(1): 181-193. https://doi.org/10.31014/aior.1992.07.01.568.
Fitza MA. (2017). “How much do CEOs really matter? Reaffirming that the CEO effect is mostly due to chance”. Strategic Management Journal. 38: 802-811. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2597.
---------------. (2014). “The use of variance decomposition in the investigation of CEO effects: How large must the CEO effect be to rule out chance?”. Strategic Management Journal. 35: 1839-1852. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2192.
Flammer C. (2018). “Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate social responsibility”. Strategic Management Journal. 39: 1299-1324. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2767.
Goldman E, Rocholl J, So J. (2013). “Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts”. Review of Finance. 17: 1617-1648. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs039.
Greenwood R, Raynard M, Kodeih F, Micelotta ER, Lounsbury M. (2011). “Institutional complexity and organizational responses”. Academy of Management Annals. 5(1): 317-371. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2011.590299.
Hadani M, Bonardi JP, Dahan NM. (2017). “Corporate political activity, public policy uncertainty, and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis”. Strategic Organization. 15: 338-366. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127016651001.
Hadani M, Schuler DA. (2013). “In search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on corporate political investments”. Strategic Management Journal. 34: 165-181. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2006.
Hair JF, Black WC, Babin BJ, Anderson RE. (2019). Multivariate Data Analysis. 8th ed. Cengage Learning.
Hambrick DC, Mason PA. (1984). “Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers”. Academy of Management Review. 9(2): 193-206. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1984.4277628.
Hansen WL, Mitchell NJ. (2000). “Disaggregating and explaining corporate political activity: Domestic and foreign corporations in national politics”. American Political Science Review. 94: 891-903. https://doi.org/10.2307/2586214.
Hansen WL, Mitchell NJ, Drope JM. (2004). “Collective action, pluralism, and the legitimacy tariff: Corporate activity or inactivity in politics”. Political Research Quarterly. 57: 421-429. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290405700307.
Hersch PL, McDougall GS. (2000). “Determinants of automobile Political Action Committee contributions to house incumbents: Own versus rival effects”. Public Choice. 104: 329-343. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005179819347.
Hillman AJ, Hitt MA. (1999). “Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, participation, and strategy decisions”. Academy of Management Review. 24: 825-842.
Hillman AJ, Keim GD, Schuler D. (2004). “Corporate political activity: A review and research agenda”. Journal of Management. 30: 837-857. https://doi.org/10.2307/259357.
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidents-Coinciding/Party-Government/
Holburn GL, Vanden Bergh RG. (2014). “Integrated market and nonmarket strategies: Political campaign contributions around merger and acquisition events in the energy sector”. Strategic Management Journal. 35: 450-460. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2096.
Hough JR. (2006). “Business segment performance redux: A multilevel approach”. Strategic Management Journal. 27: 45-61. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.498.
Hox J, van de Schoot R. (2013). “Robust methods for multilevel analysis”. In Scott MA, Simonoff JS, Marx BD. (Eds.). The SAGE Handbook of Multilevel Modeling. 387-402. London: Sage. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446247600.n22.
Iversen T, Soskice D. (2006). “Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redis- tribute more than others”. American Political Science Review. 100: 165-181. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055406062083.
Iyengar S, Lelkes Y, Levendusky M, Malhotra N, Westwood SJ. (2019). “The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States”. Annual Review of Political Science. 22: 129-146. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034.
Iyengar S, Sood G, Lelkes Y. (2012). “Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization”. Public Opinion Quarterly. 76(3): 405-431. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038.
Jiang J. (1996). “REML estimation: Asymptotic behavior and related topics”. The Annals of Statistics. 24: 255-286. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1033066209.
Jost JT. (2017). “Ideological asymmetries and the essence of political psychology”. Political Psychology. 38: 167-208. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12407.
---------------. (2006). “The end of the end of ideology”. American Psychologist. 61: 651. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.651.
Jost JT, Federico CM, Napier JL. (2009). “Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective affinities”. Annual Review of Psychology. 60(1): 307-337. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600.
Katic IV, Hillman A. (2023). “Corporate political activity, reimagined: Revisiting the political marketplace”. Journal of Management. 49: 1911-1938. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063221137069.
Kim H, Fording RC. (2002). “Government partisanship in Western democracies, 1945–1998”. European Journal of Political Research. 41: 187-206. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00009.
---------------. (1998). “Voter ideology in Western democracies, 1946–1989”. European Journal of Political Research. 33: 73-97. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00376.
Klein KJ, Kozlowski SW. (2000). Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Wiley.
Lee JY, Yahiaoui D, Lee KP, Cooke FL. (2022). “Global talent management and multinational subsidiar- ies’ resilience in the Covid-19 crisis: Moderating roles of regional headquarters’ support and headquarters– subsidiary friction”. Human Resource Management. 61: 355-372. https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm.22100.
Li H, Meng L, Wang Q, Zhou LA. (2008). “Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms”. Journal of Development Economics. 87(2): 283-299. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.03.001.
Lux S, Crook TR, Woehr DJ. (2011). “Mixing business with politics: A meta-analysis of the antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity”. Journal of Management. 37: 223-247. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206310392233.
Macher JT, Mayo JW. (2015). “Influencing public policymaking: Firm-, industry-, and country-level determi-nants”. Strategic Management Journal. 36: 2021-2038. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2326.
Mackey A. (2008). “The effect of CEOs on firm performance”. Strategic Management Journal. 29: 1357-1367. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.708.
McClosky H, Zaller J. (1984). The American ethos: Public attitudes toward capitalism and democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
McGahan AM, Porter ME. (2005). “Industry, corporate and business-segment effects and business performance: A non-parametric approach by Ruefli and Wiggins”. Strategic Management Journal. 26: 873-880. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.480.
---------------. (1997). “How much does industry matter, really?”. Strategic Management Journal. 18: 15-30. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199707)18:1+<15::AID-SMJ916>3.0.CO;2-1.
McWilliams A, Van Fleet DD, Cory KD. (2002). “Raising rivals’ costs through political strategy: An extension of resource-based theory”. Journal of Management Studies. 39: 707-724. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00308.
Mellahi K, Frynas JG, Sun P, Siegel D. (2016). “A review of the nonmarket strategy literature: Toward a multi- theoretical integration”. Journal of Management. 42: 143-173. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206315617241.
Meyer-Doyle P, Lee S, Helfat CE. (2019). “Disentangling the microfoundations of acquisition behavior and performance”. Strategic Management Journal. 40: 1733-1756. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3069.
Misangyi VF, Elms H, Greckhamer T, Lepine JA. (2006). “A new perspective on a fundamental debate: A multilevel approach to industry, corporate, and business unit effects”. Strategic Management Journal. 27: 571-590. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.530.
Mitchell NJ, Hansen WL, Jepsen EM. (1997). “The determinants of domestic and foreign corporate political activity”. The Journal of Politics. 59: 1096-1113. https://doi.org/10.2307/2998594.
Mizruchi MS. (1989). “Similarity of political behavior among large American corporations”. American Journal of Sociology. 95: 401-424. https://doi.org/10.1086/229274.
Mohammadi Elyasi G, Chitsaz E, Gerami A. (2010). “Identifying internal organizational factors affecting the performance of startups”. New Economy and Commerce. 6(21-22): 27-48. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/118653/fa [in Persian]
Moreno M, Harwell M, Guzey SS, Phillips A, Moore JT. (2016). “Complex applications of HLM in studies of science and mathematics achievement: Cross-classified random effects models”. School Science and Mathematics. 116: 338-351. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssm.12191.
Nalick M, Kuban S, Ridge JW, Zardkoohi A, Bierman L, Schijven M. (2023). “When not one of the crowd: The effects of CEO ideological divergence on lobbying strategy”. Journal of Management. 49: 1106-1139. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063211073690.
www.opensecrets.org
Osborne JW. (2010). “Improving your data transformations: Applying the Box-Cox transformation”. Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation. 15(12), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.7275/qbpc-gk17.
Pierson P, Schickler E. (2020). “Madison’s constitution under stress: A developmental analysis of political polar-ization”. Annual Review of Political Science. 23: 37-58. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033629.
Proxy Preview. (2024). “As You Sow”. https://www.proxypreview.org.
Quigley TJ, Graffin SD. (2017). “Reaffirming the CEO effect is significant and much larger than chance: A comment on Fitza (2014)”. Strategic Management Journal. 38: 793-801. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2503.
Raudenbush SW. (1993). “A crossed random effects model for unbalanced data with applications in cross-sectional and longitudinal research”. Journal of Educational Statistics. 18: 321-349. https://doi.org/10.3102/10769986018004321.
Raudenbush SW, Bryk AS. (2002). Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Rehbein K, Schuler DA. (2015). “Linking corporate community programs and political strategies: A resource- based view”. Business & Society. 54: 794-821. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650313478024.
---------------. (1999). “Testing the firm as a filter of corporate political action”. Business & Society. 38: 144-166. https://doi.org/10.1177/000765039903800202.
Richardson AM, Welsh AH. (1995). “Robust restricted maximum likelihood in mixed linear models”. Biometrics. 51: 1429-1439. https://doi.org/10.2307/2533273.
Ridge JW, Ingram A, Hill AD. (2017). “Beyond lobbying expenditures: How lobbying breadth and political connectedness affect firm outcomes”. Academy of Management Journal. 60: 1138-1163. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0584.
Rudy BC, Johnson AF. (2019). “The chief political officer: CEO characteristics and firm investment in corpo- rate political activity”. Business & Society. 58: 612-643. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650316675606.
Rumelt RP. (1991). “How much does industry matter?”. Strategic Management Journal. 12: 167-185. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250120302.
Sablin KS, Kislitsyn DV. (2024). “Political Connections of Top Entrepreneurs: Approaches to Measuring and Evidence in Contemporary Russia”. Journal of Siberian Federal University.Humanities & Social Sciences. 17(3). https://elib.sfu-kras.ru/handle/2311/152709.
Schein EH. (1992). Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Schmidt MG. (1996). “When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy”. European Journal of Political Research. 30: 155-183. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00673.x.
Schuler DA. (1996). “Corporate political strategy and foreign competition: The case of the steel industry”. Academy of Management Journal. 39: 720-737. https://doi.org/10.5465/256661.
Schuler DA, Rehbein K, Green CD. (2019). “Is corporate political activity a field?”. Business & Society. 58: 1376-1405. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650316680206.
Scott WR. (2008). Institutions and organizations: Ideas and interests. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Selznick P. (2011). Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation. New Orleans, LA: Quid Pro Books.
Semadeni M, Chin M, Krause R. (2022). “Pumping the brakes: Examining the imPolitical Action Committeet of CEO political ideology divergence on firm responses”. Academy of Management Journal. 65: 516-544. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2019.1131.
Shaffer B. (1995). “Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and research approaches”. Journal of Management. 21: 495-514.
Short JC, Ketchen DJ Jr., Bennett N, Du Toit M. (2006). “An examination of firm, industry, and time effects on performance using random coefficients modeling”. Organizational Research Methods. 9: 259-284. https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428106287572.
Tahoun A. (2014). “The role of stock ownership by US members of congress on the market for political favors”. Journal of Financial Economics. 111: 86-110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.008.
Tripathi M. (2000). “Political Action Committee contributions and defense contracting”. Business and Politics. 2: 53-73. https://doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1003.
Unsal O, Hassan MK, Zirek D. (2016). “Corporate lobbying, CEO political ideology and firm performance”. Journal of Corporate Finance. 38: 126-149. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.04.001.
USAGov. (2023). “Branches of the U.S. government”. https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government.
www.usaspending.gov.
Wang L, Fan X, Willson VL. (1996). “Effects of nonnormal data on parameter estimates and fit indices for a model with latent and manifest variables: An empirical study”. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal. 3: 228-247.
Witko C. (2011). “Campaign contributions, access, and government contracting”. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 21: 761-778. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mur005.
Zardkoohi A. (1988). “Market structure and campaign contributions: Does concentration matter? A reply”. Public Choice. 58: 187-191. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00125723.
Zhang L. (2005). “Do measures of college quality matter? The effect of college quality on graduates’ earnings”. The Review of Higher Education. 28: 571-596. https://doi.org/10.1353/rhe.2005.0053.
مطالعات کشورها
دوره 3، شماره 3
1404
صفحه 443-481

فایل ها

سابقه مقاله

  • تاریخ دریافت: 23 اسفند 1403
  • تاریخ پذیرش: 27 اسفند 1403

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار